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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
JOSEPH TRUELOVE WILSON 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 950214-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdicl onferred mi thin- i inn I by Tit le 'M 
Chapter 2a, Section 3 (2)(f) Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended), 
which grants original appellate jurisdiction to the Court of 
Appeal • - - except capital a nil fiisl 
degree felonies. The appellant was convicted of burglary of a 
dwelling, a second degree felony, two counts of assault, Class B 
:n:i i s d e m e a n o i s ai i ell c i le i >11111 I i } 11.11 a 1 1 oi i i t r \ Spouse Abuse 
Protection Order, a Class A misdemeanor. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The l.nl. Lov / i ny i i-fsues are presented foi leview in this brief: 
"I Did the Court err in permitting the testimony of two 
witnesses concerning statements by appellant? 
Standard of review: Where there is a claim of error by the trial 
court in admitting evidence, while considerable discretion is 
accorded the trial court, it is an ultimate question of law. 
State v. Pena, ) When a challenge to a trial 
court's decision concerns a question of law there is a review for 
correctness. State v. Duncan, 812 P.2d 60 (Ut.App 3 991) 
1 
2. Was the court's application of the law to prevent 
questioning a witness about relevant evidence erroneous? 
Standard of review: Appellant incorporates the standard of review 
for issue number one. 
3. Was there insufficient evidence to support appellant's 
conviction for assault of Lisa Wilson? 
Standard of review: Viewing evidence and reasonable inferences 
drawn from it, reversal is warranted when such evidence is 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds would 
have a reasonable doubt that appellant committed the crime. Claims 
of insufficiency of the evidence require defendant to marshall 
evidence which supports the verdict and demonstrate why the 
evidence is insufficient to support the verdict. State v. Caver, 
814 P.2d, 604 (Ut.App. 1991); State v. Goddard. 871 P.2d 540 (Utah 
1994) 
STATUTES. RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Appearing in Addendum A to this brief are the following: 
Article I Section 7 Constitution of Utah 
Amendment XIV Constitution of the United States 
Rule 401 Utah Rules of Evidence 
Rule 402 Utah Rules of Evidence 
Rule 403 Utah Rules of Evidence 
Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 102 Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1 l 
of Title 76, Chapter 6 Section 202 Utah Code Ann ,(1953 as 
amended), burglary of a dwelling, a second degree felony; two 
C i I in 1 I I * i i i 1 1 ill mi 1 mi in in (mi mi 1 * 
Utah Code Ann. (1953 amended), III a s s B mi sdemeanors and 
Violation of Spouse Abuse Protection Order, violation of Title 
7 6, CI: lapt e i 5, Sec: t: I oi i ] 08, Utah Code Ann, » i «11. ai < - ), a 
Class misdemeanor Appellant was originally charged with 
aggravated burglary, a first degree felony * violation of Title 
78
 r Chapter " Sec 11,. 11 .'" < I ! Utah Code Ann. ( .* s amended ), bi it 
was found guilty of the lesser included offense, aforesaid. 
Appellant was originally charged with stalking in violation of 
TI L i *: chapter Jection 106.5 Utah Code Ann, (i Q ^3 as 
amended), a Class B misdemeanor. That charge was dismissed at the 
preliminary hearing on October 13, 1994. 
The trial was before a jury, commencing on December * 1QQyI 
Appellant was sentenced on March 13, 1995 to a term In the 
Utah State Prison n! il I f v . I I in 111 i n in 1 I 1 i n n i n »* ^ * • 
(15) years, which sentence runs consecutively with the concurrent 
terms of incarceration for assault (six (6) months) and Violation 
of Spouse Abuse Protection Ordei 1 I 1 J 1 IMNH (II,11) months). 
The Notice of Appeal was filed on March 20, 1995. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On September 11, 1994, in Salt Lake County, at the residence 
of Lisa Wilson, appellant was accused in an Information with 
entering or remaining unlawfully, with the intent to commit an 
assault. Present at the residence were Lisa Wilson and a friend, 
Willey McDonald. McDonald testified that between 8:30 or 9:00 p.m., 
he heard a loud crash at a window in the residence (R.479). 
McDonald observed appellant coming through a room in the house. 
Appellant attempted to strike McDonald and a fight between the two 
men ensued.(R pg. 482-488) 
McDonald observe appellant exit out the back door, whereupon 
McDonald picked up a hammer and went outside of the dwelling. After 
making a threatening comment, appellant left the area (R 488-489). 
Lisa Wilson testified that during the fight between the two 
men, she exited the residence while calling the 911 operator on a 
cordless phone (R pg 517-518). Appellant came up to this witness 
and "grabbed the back of my dress" (R 519). Wilson observed a 
neighbor, Steven Baeder, holding appellant while McDonald exited 
the residence. While Lisa Wilson was still talking on the phone, 
appellant left the area (R 521). 
Steven Baeder testified that, having heard a window break in 
the Wilson residence, he went over to that home. Stepping inside 
the door, he saw appellant and Lisa Wilson. He went back outside 
with Wilson, followed by appellant. He observed appellant "grabbing 
Lisa's arm with that hand and wouldn't let her go" (R 571). Baeder 
then "grabbed Joe from behind and kind of gave him a bearhug and 
4 
told him to let go..."(R 571). 
The State's Prosecutor filed a motion to limit the scope of 
cross-examination. (R 70) The State wanted to limit cross-
examination of Lisa Wilson regarding her activity and state of 
dress prior to appellant entering the residence. The State argued, 
in support of the motion, that such evidence was irrelevant and 
that it was more prejudicial than probative and was offered for no 
other purpose than to harass the witness.(R 440-442). 
Appellant argued that what he saw in the bedroom caused him 
concern for his children and that such evidence was relevant to his 
state of mind in entering the home. (R 442-444) The Court 
determined to deny the motion insofar as it sought to prohibit 
testimony about what appellant observed. However, if there was no 
testimony or evidence that appellant could actually see into the 
window then such evidence was not probative and questions regarding 
the conduct of Lisa Wilson or her state of dress would not be 
permitted. 
THE COURT: Well, the ruling is that you can't 
get into that line of questioning, whether 
it's on cross-examination or on your own case 
in chief unless there has been evidence in the 
record that you could actually see into the 
window and there were not draperies or 
something else preventing that. That's t h e 
ruling... Well, I am saying that there has to 
be evidence that he could see into the window. 
That's what I said. But if there is something 
covering such that he cannot see, he cannot 
claim that he had a state of mind about 
something that he couldn't have seen at the 
time. So there has to be evidence first that 
he could see into the window. That's all. 
Okay? That's the ruling. (R 445-446) 
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Appellant filed a Motion in Limine seeking to exclude evidence 
that had not been previously supplied to defense counsel pursuant 
to discovery requests. (R 103) This included testimony from two 
witnesses. The first witness was Bruce Galton, a neighbor of Lisa 
Wilson who was to testify regarding statements appellant made in 
leaving the Wilson residence following the incident. (R 637) The 
second witness was Carol Pia, mother of Lisa Wilson, who would 
testify that she recieved a telephone call in the late evening of 
September 11, 1994, which was taperecorded, wherein appellant 
indicated to her that "he said, I'm going to put an end to all of 
this if I have to take all of you with me." (R 645) Appellant 
objected to the testimony of these witnesses on the grounds that 
counsel had not been supplied with the information, pursuant to 
discovery request, about the existence of these witnesses and their 
testimony. (R 446-452) Those objections were renewed, appellant 
further arguing that " the prejudicial nature of that evidence so 
outweighs probative value. There is so much prejudice to Mr. Wilson 
that they ought not be allowed to use it since they didn't provide 
it." (R582-585) 
The court determined to suppress this evidence and not permit 
these witnesses to testify regarding appellant's statements.(R595) 
The State requested a reconsideration of that ruling. (R 618) The 
court did reconsider its previous ruling and determined to allow 
the witnesses' to testify (R 624-627). 
Following the testimony of those witnesses, appellant made a 
Motion for Mistrial based on a failure by the State to provide 
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information pursuant to discovery and "the prejudicial value versus 
the probative value of letting that in." That motion was denied. 
(R 648-650) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Appellant submits that the court erred in admitting evidence 
and in preventing defendant from eliciting testimony. In the first 
instance it was appropriate for appellant to inquire regarding the 
conduct and state of dress of Lisa Wilson prior to his entry into 
the home. That testimony from both Lisa Wilson and McDonald would 
have been relevant regarding appellant's intent. 
The testimony of Galton and Pia was irrelevant and, pursuant 
to Rule 403 Utah Rules of Evidence, should have been suppressed as 
the prejudicial effect of that testimony outweighed its probative 
value. 
The evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction for 
assault of Lisa Wilson because there was no evidence which showed 
that appellant had attempted, with unlawful force and violence to 
do bodily injury to Lisa Wilson. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DID THE COURT ERR IN PERMITTING THE TESTIMONY 
OF TWO WITNESSES CONCERNING STATEMENTS BY 
APPELLANT? 
7 
Two witnesses testified regarding statements appellant made 
subsequent to the incident at the Wilson home. Bruce Galton 
testified about a comment appellant made while leaving the scene of 
the incident. As appellant walked passed Galton he yelled, "If I go 
to jail, when I get out I'll kill you." (R 638) 
Carol Pia, mother of Lisa Wilson, testified that later in the 
evening of September 11th she recieved a telephone call from 
appellant. During the course of that conversation, appellant 
indicated to her that "I'm going to put an end to all of this if I 
have to take all of you with me." (R 645) 
Appellant objected to the testimony of the two witnesses on 
the grounds that, pursuant to discovery requests, he had not been 
supplied with the names of these witnesses and the substance of 
their testimony. Also, appellant objected, pursuant to Rule 403 
Utah Rules of Evidence, that this testimony was prejudicial and any 
probative value which it had was outweighed by this prejudice. 
The Court initially suppressed this evidence and would not 
permit the testimony of these witnesses. However, it reversed 
itself after the State's prosecutor submitted a copy of the opinion 
in State v. Archuletta 850 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1993). 
The thrust of this issue is whether the testimony of these two 
witnesses should have been excluded because appellant was not 
advised of their existence and the substance of their testimony or, 
whether the relevance of their testimony was outweighed by its 
prejudicial effect. 
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First, the State failed to disclose to appellant that there 
were two witnesses to testify regarding statements appellant made 
following the incident at the Wilson home. In State v. Knight 734 
P.2d 913 (Utah 1987), the State failed to disclose statements from 
two witnesses and their unanticipated testimony. The court erred in 
not continuing the trial or granting a mistrial. This failure 
constituted an abuse of discretion warranting a reversal. That 
error is considered of such prejudice that reversal is required if 
there is a demonstration that without the error there is a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result. (Refer Knight, 
supra, at pg 919-921) 
In this case, the State failed to adequately inform appellant 
of the existence of these two witnesses. It was not until the eve 
of trial that an attempt was made by the State to inform appellant. 
Appellant indicated to the Court that there was insufficient time 
to adequately investigate and be prepared. What little time existed 
for such investigation was further shortened by the reversal of the 
initial ruling by the Court. 
In reversing itself and allowing the witnesses to testify, the 
Court speculated that this further investigation by appellant was 
unnecessary. This was based on the speculative assumption that 
there was nothing to investigate. But, especially given the 
relationship of Carol Pia to Lisa Wilson, that assumption was 
misplaced. Pretrial strategy and trial preparation were effected. 
It is irrelevant to speculate about the results of further defense 
investigation about these witnesses. If their testimony impacted on 
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a crucial aspect of the trial, then appellant should have been 
given an adequate opportunity to undermine this evidence. It is in 
this failure to give such an opportunity, regardless of the 
results, wherein lies the Court's error. 
Secondly, and in the alternative, the Court erred in allowing 
this testimony because it was either irrelevant (Rule 401 and 402), 
or probative value of the testimony was substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice.(Rule 403) Appellant's statements 
were made following the incident. In one instance immediately 
thereafter and in another instance, some time had elapsed. Both 
statements indicated that appellant was mad and threatening action 
but not directly related to the allegations of the charges for 
which he was being tried. These statements were indications of 
appellant's state of mind following the incident as much as 
speculation concerning his state of mind and intent prior to or 
during the incident. Thus, they are either irrelevant or serve to 
prejudice the jury. Their probative value in demonstrating 
appellant' s state of mind in relation to the elements of the 
offenses charged were outweighed by this prejudice. 
POINT II 
WAS THE COURT'S APPLICATION OF THE LAW TO 
PREVENT QUESTIONING A WITNESS ABOUT RELEVANT 
EVIDENCE ERRONEOUS? 
The State's prosecutor filed a Motion in Limine to prevent 
appellant from questioning Lisa Wilson or Willey McDonald regarding 
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the activity of these two people and state of dress prior to 
appellant entering the residence. Appellant contended that he had 
observed these two people having sexual intercourse and Lisa Wilson 
partially undressed as he looked through the window to the bedroom. 
This was the reason he entered the home, believing that this was an 
inappropriate activity while his children were present. The 
argument was that such evidence reflected on the victim's character 
and was, consequently, irrelevant to the elements of the offenses 
charged.[Refer R 070-074; State v. Williams, 773 P.2d 1368 (Utah 
1989)] 
Appellant argued that this evidence was relevant to show his 
intention and state of mind in entering the residence. The argument 
was that appellant intended to rescue his children from a 
detrimental environment which had been created by Lisa Wilson and 
McDonald, the inference being that appellant did not intend to 
commit an assault, but rather to intercede in an inappropriate 
activity. 
The trial Court, apparently, agreed that this evidence was 
relevant to appellant's state of mind. However, the Court erred in 
imposing a condition precedent to its introduction. The Court 
required that there be a demonstration, even before the testimony 
of these witnesses, that appellant could see in the window and view 
the activity of which he complained. This condition precedent 
imposed an impossible burden on appellant and effectively precluded 
him from introducing this evidence. 
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POINT III 
WAS THERE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT 
APPELLANT'S CONVICTION FOR THE ASSAULT OF LISA 
WILSON? 
In reviewing sufficiency of the evidence, great deference is 
paid to the jury verdict. From the evidence and reasonable 
inferences drawn from it, all the elements of the crime must be 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt to sustain the verdict. (Refer 
State v. Jiron 882 P.2d 685 (UT. App. 1994); State v. Goddard 871 
P.2d 540 (Utah 1994); State v. James 819 P.2d 781 (Utah 1981); 
State v. Gardener 789 P.2d 273 (Utah 1989). 
Count III of the Information charged appellant with a 
violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 102, Utah Code Ann. (1953 
as amended), alleging that he assaulted Lisa Wilson by attempting, 
with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to Lisa Wilson 
(R 08). 
Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 102, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as 
amended), defines assault as an attempt, with unlawful force or 
violence, to do bodily injury to another. The probable cause 
statement contained in the Information alleged that "Mrs. Wilson 
suffered lacerations on her back and arms, ...."(R 010) At trial, 
however, testimony was deficient in proving this assault and the 
alleged injuries sustained by Mrs. Wilson. Willey McDonald 
testified that following the altercation with him in the house, 
appellant left and McDonald went to the kitchen where he picked up 
a hammer. He then went outside and saw the next door neighbor and 
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appellant holding Lisa Wilson's dress at the back area. (R 488-489; 
507). 
Lisa Wilson testified that during the course of the 
altercation between appellant and McDonald, she exited the 
residence out the back door while talking on the phone with the 911 
operator. Appellant then ran up to her and grabbed the back of her 
dress indicating concern for his children who were in the house. (R 
518-519). 
Steven Baeder testified, 
A: Well, I got to the door and she opened up 
the door and came running out. I stepped 
inside the door and looked up a half flight of 
stairs at the Lisa and saw Joe Wilson at the 
top of the landing with blood on his face. 
Then I went back outside with Lisa and Joe 
followed us. He, with one hand --I could only 
see one hand as I recall— he was grabbing 
Lisa's arm with that hand and wouldn't let her 
go. 
I grabbed Joe from behind and kind of gave him 
a bearhug and told him to let go and said, 
Joe, this isn't doing any good. And he 
wouldn't let go for a minute or two or so. And 
finally Lisa got away. And then I let go of 
Joe." (R 571) 
It was incumbent on the State to prove, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that appellant, knowingly and intentionally, attempted with 
unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to Lisa Wilson. The 
facts, through the testimony of these witnesses, are totally 
deficient in proving the essential elements of that offense. The 
clear indication from this testimony is that, rather than intend to 
attempt to do bodily injury, appellant was intending to attempt to 
restrain Wilson in order to either confront her with his concern 
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for the children or prevent her from continuing the telephone 
conversation.(Refer R 650-653) 
The statute requires more than an indication of intent to 
commit an act of physical violence whose object is to cause bodily 
injury. There must also be evidence that an attempt was made to do 
bodily injury. This includes not only the mental element but also 
a physical action. 
It is speculation that appellant intended, at any point during 
the incident, to cause Lisa Wilson bodily injury. However, the 
evidence is void of any indication that appellant attempted to do 
bodily injury. Holding on to the dress or arm leaves considerable 
room for doubt as to whether this amounts to some attempt to 
inflict injury. 
Consequently, there was insufficient evidence to convict 
appellant of this assault because there is reasonable doubt 
concerning appellantf s intent and whether he attempted to do bodily 
inj ury. 
REASONS SUPPORTING ORAL ARGUMENT 
Appellant requests oral argument in this matter as it would be 
helpful to clarify the issues in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
Testimony of two witnesses was permitted over objection to a 
violation of discovery requests and its probative value was 
outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Appellant was improperly 
precluded from introducing relevant evidence regarding intent and 
14 
state of mind and there was insufficient evidence to support 
appellant's conviction for assault of Lisa Wilson. 
Count III of the Information should be dismissed because of 
insufficient evidence and the other charges should be reversed and 
remanded for a new trial. * 
DATED this ITL day of j\A Jy , 1995. 
Respectfully sutpitted, 
JOSEPH C. FRATT<OV'<JR. 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that four (4) copies of the forgoing Brief of 
Appellant were delivered to the Attorney General's Office, 236 




THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 1. [Citizenship - Due process of law-
Equal protection.] 
...nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Article I, Section 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law. 
UTAH CRIMINAL CODE ANN. 
Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 102. Assault. 
(1) Assault is: 
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily 
injury to another; 
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or 
violence, to do bodily injury to another; or 
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that 
causes or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another. 
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor. 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
Rule 401. Definition of "relevant evidence." 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make 
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it 
would be without the evidence. 
Rule 402, Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant 
evidence inadmissable. 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise 
provide by the Constitution of the United States or the 
Constitution of the State of Utah, statute, or by these rules, or 
by other rules applicable in courts of this state. Evidence which 
is not relevant is not admissible. 
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice, 
confusion, or waste of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence. 
